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National Security and the Strategic Economic Base 
Economic Impacts of the Legalization of Gambling Activities1
John Warren Kindt
Introduction
According to Nobel Prize winning economist Paul Samuelson 2 it is basic economics that
[Gambling] involves simply sterile transfers of mone\ or goods between individuals creating no new money 
or goods Although it creates no output gambling does nevertheless absorb time and resources When 
pursued beyond the limits of recreation where the main purpose after all is to kill time gambling subtracts 
from the national income 3
Similarly from a political science/economic viewpoint Professor Jack Van Der Slik has summarized 
these basic principles echoing much of the academic community [State sponsored gambling] produces no 
product no new wealth and so it makes no genuine contribution to economic development 4
Government leaders of the United States are also beginning to raise some concerns For example in 1992 
U S Senator Paul Simon of Illinois— a state which has rapidly legalized various gambling activities— read into 
the Congressional Record an article written by an authontative economics professor 5 According to Senator 
Simon the article confirmed his own instinct that Communities and States and the Nation should be careful 
when they look for easy revenue cures that may do more damage than they realize 6 Based upon these concerns 
in 1993 Senator Simon introduced to the Senate the Gambling Impact Study Commission Act7 which was 
designed to conduct a thorough study of all matters relating to the impact of gambling on States political 
subdivisions of States and Native American tribes 8 and to explore possible alternative sources of revenue 9
Similarly on September 21 1994 Congressman John J LaFalce the Chair of the House Committee on 
Small Business held a hearing on the socio economic impacts of the trend toward legalized gambling 
activities 10 At the hearing the committee received testimony from various experts all of whom criticized the 
impacts legalized gambling activities inflict upon social welfare budgets 11 the criminal justice system 12 small 
businesses13 and the United States economic base 14 Among other conclusions presented legalized gambling—
1 A modified version of this article was published as John Kindt U.S. National Security and the Strategic Economic Base. The 
Business/Economic Impacts of the Legalization of Gambling Activities 39 St Louis U L J  567 (1995)
Paul A Samuelson won the Nobel Prize in Economic Science in 1970
3 PAULA SAMUELSON ECONOMICS 4^5 (10th ed 1976)
4 Jack R Van Der Slik Legalized Gambling Predatory Policy ILLINOIS ISSUES Mar 1990 at 30 30 This particular article 
was printed m a publication directed toward employees of the state of Illinois Illinois is a developing gambling state
5 138 CONG REC S I 87 (daily ed Jan 2~> 1992) (reprinted article by Economics Professor Earl Gnnols Gambling Doesn t
Pav It Costs . .  . Rettine Parlors Siphon Off More Money From Communities than They Generate ST LOUIS POST DISPATCH 
Non P  1991 at C3)
6 id (statement of Sen Paul Simon)
7 S 17“>0 103d Cong 1st Sess (1993)
8 Id § 4(a)(1)
9 Id * 4(a)(2)(B)
10 See generally Hearing on the National Impact of Casino Gambling Proliferation Hearings Before the House Comm on Small 
Business 103d Cong ">d Sess l-3 '> (1994) [hereinafter Cong Hearing!
11 See, e g . Cong Hearing supra note 10 at 8">-86 (statement of Valerie C Lorenz PhD Compulsive Gambling Ctr ) The 
onl\ generally positive testimony was by a local administrator from Tunica Mississippi who focused on the initial economic flash 
in the local economy and not on the regional economy 1¿ at 50-^5 (testimonv of Webster C Franklin Tunica County 
Mississippi) In contrast the expert testimony was quite negative E -  . id at 4"’-49  56-70 71-76 8^—88
1 See Con„ Hearing supra note 10 at 14-18 (testimony of Jeffrv L Bloombere State s Attv Lawrence Countv S D )
I 3 See Con- Heann- supra note 10 at 33-35 (statement of Con ressman Richard H Baker)
14 See Con_ Heann- supra note 10 at 4 -8  (testimonv of Profe or Roben Goodman Lmversitv ot Mas a husetts)
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as a strategy for economic development— was thoroughly discredited 1 Indeed at the start of the hearing 
Congressman LaFalce expressed his own concerns for the issue 16 and expressed a need for a national policy 17 
However despite these expressed concerns legalized gambling activities continue to spread across the nation 18
With the legalization of various types of gambling activities sweeping the United States and much of the 
international community the issue is whether this trend constitutes an economic boom a harmless recreational 
pastime or an actual threat to the strategic economic base of the industrialized world and in particular of the 
United States 19 Business economic history indicates that the legalization of gambling activities precipitates a 
classic boom and bust economic cycle 70 Accordingly this Article concludes that because widespread legalized 
gambling activities represent such a threat to the strategic U S economic base and to stability of expectations ! 
Congress should seriously consider federal legislation to re criminalize or severely limit practically all types of 
legalized gambling activity As an interim measure Congress should consider withholding federal funds from 
those states intent on experimenting w th legalized gambling activities for individual states should not be 
allowed to engage in a type of economic secession which threatens the nation s entire economic bas 77
The strategic economic threat to the United States is immediate and should be addressed quickly before 
newly developing constituencies in the legalizing gambling industry become widespread enough to dictate 
economic policy 24 For example the legalized gambling industry drafted a state constitutional referendum in
15 See Cong Hearing supra note 10 at 57 76 81 86 88 100-01 105-06
16 Cong Hearing supra note 10 at l - 7 (introductory statement of Congressman John J LaFalce)
17 Cong Hearing supra note 10 at 13 (statement of Congressman John J LaFalce)
18 See e_g_ Terry Ganey & Mark Schlinkmann Hancock II Out. Slot Games In ST LOUIS POST DISPATCH Nov 9 1994
at A6 [hereinafter Slot Games Ini ( After three tries full blown nverboat gambling in Missouri became a reality as voters approved 
the games of chance amendment 54 to 46 percent ) Multiple re votes are commonly utilized as a strategy by legalized gambling 
proponents to wear down and out spend their opponents S s s  id see also infra note 25 (giving examples of multiple re votes in 
different states as recorded in the congressional hearing on Sept 21 1994)
19 See generally John W Kindt The Economic Impacts of Legalized Gambling Activities 43 DRAKE L REV 53 (1994) 
[hereinafter Economic lmpactsl
">0 See Cong. Hearing supra note 10 at 77 (statement of Professor John W Kindt University of Illinois)
21 This particular article is summary in scope but it was conceived within the penumbra of the McDougal/Lasswell model for 
decision making In the areas of legal and government policy which subsume strategic socio economic and business concerns the 
classic decision making models were formulated by the post legal realists in particular Professor Myres McDougal and Professor 
Harold Lasswell who postulated a conceptual framework for legal decision making m a landmark article directed toward legal educators 
and law professors Harold D Lasswell & Myres S McDougal Legal Education and Public Policy Professional Training in the 
Public Interest 57 YALE L J 203 (1943) see also Harold D Lasswell & Myres S McDougal Criteria for a Theory about Law 44 
S C a l if  L REV 362 (1971) Myres S McDougal Jurisprudence for a Free Society 1 Ga L REV 1(1966) John W Kindt An 
Analysis Qf Leggi Ed.uc.aUQh.A.i3ld-Biime.Si-EddÇ.^ i9a Within J h ç  Context Qf A J D /MBA Program 31 J LEGAL EDUC 512 517-18 
(1981) John W Kindt An Analysis Qf Legal Education And Business Education Within The Context Of A J D/MBA Programme 13 
LAW TEACHER l 7 14-16 (1979) The decision making concepts which McDougal and Lasswell introduced were later expanded to 
include international law and U S domestic law as these areas interfaced with policy oriented jurisprudence John N Moore 
Prolegomenon to the Jurisprudence of Mvres McDougal and Harold Lasswell 54 Va L REV 667 (1968) The Lasswell McDougal 
Enterprise Toward a World Public Order of Human Dignity 14 Va J IN T L L  535 (1974)
7 Sœ ROBERT GOODMAN LEGALIZED GAMBLING AS A STRATEGY FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Ctr Econ Development 
U Mass Amherst 1994) [hereinafter CED REPORT]
Gambling has grown in an ad hoc copy cat manner as states follow each others leads responding to revenue 
shortfalls and the fear that neighboring states or Indian tribes will siphon off their gambling dollars Once 
gambling ventures are legalized and governments become dependent on their revenues the future form and spread of 
gambling within a state becomes extremely difficult to control 
Id at 16
3 Cong Hearing supra note 10 at 10 (oral testimony of Economics Professor Earl L Gnnols University of Illinois) 
According to Professor Gnnols the threat exists because of the fact that
State representatives have no incentive to view gambling in terms of its overall effect on the countrv To [states] it is a 
wav to raise tax money— hopefully from people of neighboring States who will take their problems back home— e en 
though the social costs for an additional dollar of tax raised throu h ambling is in the range of S3 0 per dollar raised 
compared to onlv SI 45 for raising taxes the old fashioned wav by raisin taxes
I±
4 For an authontative analysis supporting this recommendation see CED REPORT supra note 77 at 18 Manv policvmakers 
are concerned that le alized amblin intere ts have lar e bud ets to support efforts to le alizé various forms ot amblin
throu hout the United States For example New Jersev has restrictions prohibí ti n politi al ontribution trom a ino ld
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Fionda which aimed to mandate the introduction of casino style gambling activities— even into communities 
which voted unanimously against such activities 5 It is thereby not surprising that testimony presented at the 
1994 congressional heanng indicated that in the future franchised legalized gambling parlors may be as 
widespread as the fast food hamburger chains are today 76
Thus the gravamen of the 1994 heanng was that U S policymakers should heed the wake up call to 
develop a national policy on increased legalized gambling activities 77 Furthermore the potential economic drain 
which the advent of legalized gambling activities has on the pre existing economy is so large that states should 
be prohibited from questionable exemptions de jure  of legalized gambling activities from common antitrust 
pnnciples At a minimum a foresightful national policy should be developed to counteract the false short term
B\ comparison in 1990 Illinois lifted its ban on contributions from racetracks and had no limitations on political 
contributions by interests promoting legalized gambling All such contributions were legal Between January 1 1993 and 
April 10 1994 the Chicago Sun Times reported that Illinois Governor James Edgar and state legislators [had] received 
at least S674 1T> from gambling interests not including tens of thousands of dollars from lawyers lobbvists and consultants 
who are representing gambling clients Mark Brown & Ray Long Gambling A Political Jackpot New Funding Powerhouse 
Aids •> in 3 Legislators CHI SUN TIMES Apr 10 1994 at IA 16A
See Martin Dyckman Misleading the Public ST PETERSBURG TIMES Nov 1 1994 at A13 Propositions on the Fionda 
ballot for November 8 1994 would have initially allowed 47 casinos in Ronda The public relations tactics of the proponents for 
legalized casinos were cnticized in the press for misrepresenting the effect and impact of Proposition 8 M For example dunng the 
week of November 1 1994 a commercial supporting legalized casinos in Fionda ran with the identifier of a former Chief Justice 
Ronda State Supreme Court (Ret ) and read as follows
This is the State Constitution As a chief justice of the Ronda Supreme Court I worked to uphold it When I wrote 
Proposition 8 Limited Casinos I made sure that stnet limits on the number of casinos were put nght here That means 
politicians won t have the authonty to change or weaken the limits Only you can put the limits m the Constitution by 
voting yes on limited casinos And only a vote by you can change those limits With Limited Casinos you have the 
final say
Dyckman supra at A l3 According to one cntical account in the press [t]he effect of the commercial— whether intended or not — 
[was] to wrap [the former chief justice s] sleazy new clients in his old judicial robes id The account further noted that 
voters could easily take the justice s statement to mean that there could be slot machines on every street comer unless they voted for 
Proposition 8
The fact is that casino gambling is not only against existing Ronda law but in the opinion of Attorney General Bob 
Butterworth against the present Constitution as well The present limit on casinos is zero 0 none If voters fall 
for [the former chief justice s] line the new limit will be 47 That is a far cry from 0
What s more 30 of those casinos are reserved forever for the existing horse tracks dog tracks and jai alai plants 
Another on Miami Beach as well desenbed by my colleague Jeanny Deam last weekend is reserved for a millionaire 
German carpetbagger who maneuvered Roberts into a comer These people would have a perpetual monopoly on 
31 of the 47 licenses and for [the former chief justice] to cast that as a virtue in his scheme is for him to take the 
voters as biubbenng fools Finally local voters who might not want casinos in their neighborhoods will have NO SAY 
if [the former chief justice s] ingenious proposition is approved statewide 
id
Legalized gambling proponents reportedly hired firms to get this referendum question on the ballot at a cost of S'* to S3 per 
signature Sse Casinos Group to Ante Up $5 million for TV Ads ST PETERSBURG TIMES Jun 28 1994 at B4 The chairman 
of the casino dnve reportedly said that the proliferation of ballot initiatives has inflated the cost of professional petition peddlers to 
S0 ?5 a signature Id Placing Proposition 8 on the ballot required 429 4', 8 certified signatures at a cost of approximately 
S3 million ]d
The public relations budget for convincing the voters to approve this referendum question on November 8 1994 was apparently 
S16 o million— significantly more than the combined budgets of the two gubernatorial candidates Jeb Bush and Governor Lawton 
Chiles Louis Lavelle Voters Deal Loss to Casinos. Gambling Backers Lose Despite $16 5 Million Campaign T AMPA TRIBUNE 
Nov 9 1994 at 1 5 [hereinafter S16.5 Million Campaign! Casinos Gamble, and Lose. Again FLORIDA SUN at Al A6 
(S16 7 million raised by casino proponents and $1 6 million raised by opponents)
Similar scenarios and multiple re votes have occurred in other states
The proposal for casino gambling in Chicago has been defeated three times in Illinois but the proenosis is that it will 
be brought up again and again until the gambling promoters succeed In spite of millions of dollars in ambling 
ad ertisine Missourians voted down a chanee to their constitution in April [1994] to allow games of chance but the 
question is being put back on the ballot this fall 6 months later The phenomenon of stagin multiple revotes [if 
gambling is defeated] is a scenario being played out in Detroit Iowa and other places Is this good Government 
Cong Heanng supra note 10 (oral testimony of Economics Professor Earl L Gnnols Umversitv of Illinois)
**6 See Cona Heanng supra note 10 (oral testimony of Economics Professor Earl L Gnnols Umversitv of Illinois)
7 Con., Heann,, supra note 10 at 13 (statement of Heanna Chairman LaFal e statin that there is a crvin need for a 
national poll )
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incentives for states to individually introduce gambling to their common long term harm 8 A review of the 
strategic U S economy and the business economic impacts of widespread gambling activities supports these 
recommendations
The Strategic U S Economic Base and the 
Business Economic Impacts of the Legalization of Gambling Activities
In 1974 sixty one percent of the U S public participated in legalized gambling activities 79 at that time the 
total legal wager was only $17 3 billion 30 By 1993 however the U S public legali) wagered 
$394 3 billion 31 approximately $150 billion more than the U S Defense B udget37 That year the total U S 
consumer dollars won by legalized gambling operators as generated revenues amounted to $34 7 billion 3 
including $12 8 billion in gross revenues to the state lotteries 34 In other words the consumer dollars drained 
from pre existing businesses and redirected toward— or won by— legalized gambling operators increased b>
2 100 percent since 1974 3S
If this trend continues throughout the United States within a short period of time these numbers— high as 
they are— could easily begin to increase exponentially In addition it has been estimated that the net economic 
effect could be equivalent to an additional recession every eight to fifteen years 36 If this phenomenon were to 
combine with a regular cyclical recession the U S economy could face double jeopardy
In addition a brief consideration of other U S economic data lends support to the suggestion noted earlier 
by economist Paul Samuelson that gambling subtracts from the national income 37 Specifically in 1992 the 
most recent year for which statistics are available the U S national income was reported at $4 837 billion38 
whereas the gross legal wager was $330 billion39 and the gross revenues retained by the gambling industry were 
$29 9 billion 40 Significantly while the gross legal wager and gross industry revenues increased 8 4 percent41 
and 12 percent42 respectively over the figures reported in 1991 the 1992 national income increased only 6 4
">8 Cone. Hearing supra note 10 at 11 (written testimony of Economics Professor Earl L Gnnols University of Illinois)
29 Henry R Lesieur Compulsive Gambling SOCIETY May/June 1992 at 43 [hereinafter Compulsive Gambling
30 U S COMMISSION ON THE REV OF THE NAT L POL Y TOWARD GAMBLING GAMBLING IN AMERICA 63-64 (U S Gov t 
Printing Off 1976) [hereinafter COMM NON GAMBLING]
31 Eugene M Christiansen Handle Up 17.12 percent to S394B. Revenue Up 14,2 percent to S34.7B INT LGAMING & 
Wagering BUS Aug 5 1994 at 14 15 ihereinafter Handle Unl
3'> OFF MGM T&  BUDGET BUDGETOFTHE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 1994 apps 5 & 6 (budget authority 
is S^SO 7 billion outlay is S265 2 billion for 1994)
33 Handle Up supra note 31 at 19 (Table 2)
34 ¡d By comparison worldwide lottery sales m 1993 were $83 7 billion Lottery Sales Worldwide Top S83.7B In 93 INT L 
GAMING & W AGERING BUS May 5 1994 at 1 30 The United States was First in lottery sales with S 5 3 billion followed by 
Germany (S9 7 billion) Japan ($6 3 billion) Spain ($5 5 billion) France ($5 5 billion) and Canada ($3 7 billion) Id at 30
35 This presumes that the average percent (approximately 9 percent) of the amount legally wagered in 1974 or $1 57 billion was 
won In 1993 the amount won was $34 7 billion (a 14 percent increase from 199'’ ) Handle Up supra note 31 at 14 19
table 1 Therefore the increase from 1974 to 1993 was approximately 1 100 percent Of course these numbers are not adjusted for 
inflation
36 See Cong Hearing supra note 10 at 73 (written testimony of Economics Professor Earl L Gnnols University of Illinois)
37 SAMUELSON supra note 3 at 425 Since 65 percent or more of the gambling dollar is wagered by 10 percent of the public 
this market segment is theoretically wagenng beyond the limits of recreation and would ostensibly constitute a fairly direct 
subtraction from the national income For a preliminary analysis of the issues involving the percentages of the public who will 
gamble and how much see Economic Impacts supra note 19 at 60-61 73-75 77
38 BURECON ANALYSIS U S DEPTCOMMERCE S URVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS Jan 1994 at 11 (1994) (table 1 14) That 
vear the gross domestic product was reported at S6 038 billion and the gross national product income was S6 046 billion id at 10 
(table 1 9)
39 Eugene M Christiansen The 199~> Gross Annual Wager of the L S Pan 1 Handle INT L GAMING &. W AGERING BLS 
Julv Au,. 1993 at 12 [hereinafter Wager Part 11 This fi ure amounts to 7 percent of the U S national income
40 Eugene M Christiansen The 1992 Gross Annual Wager of the U S Pan II Revenue INT L GAMING &W AfiFRíNG RUS 
Au Sept 1993 at P  [hereinafter Wa„er Part 111 This figure amounts to 63 percent of the U S national income
41 W arer Part 1 supra note ^9 at 1
4 W a- r Part 11 supra note 40 at I
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percent over the prior year Initially these relative increases m the 1992 gambling totals mav appear small 
when compared to the U S national income However they are actually quite significant in fact the gambling 
figures increased in proportional significance to the national income in 1992 because the U S gambling 
industry is presently growing more rapidly than any other industry in the United States 44 Furthermore although 
gambling has just begun to expand in earnest its sales already equal approximately two and one half percent of 
Gross Domestic Product (G D P)45
In any event macro economic theories and concomitant economic formulae do not address this growing 
phenomenon With the policy changes in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere the strategic U S economic 
base will also change rapidly in the next few years and the U S Bureau of Economic Analysis (and its 
economic multipliers ) 46 as well as other economic agencies will need to keep pace Furthermore U S 
policvmakers should query whether an economy which is becoming so heavily influenced and dependent on 
legalized gambling activities— which involve creating no new money or goods 47— is similar to the oil 
dependent U S economy of the early 1970 s which was vulnerable to the 1973-74 Arab Oil embargo 48
From a historical economic perspective the boom and bust economic cycles created by legalized 
gambling activities appear throughout economic history but the two most relevant and most recent occurred in 
the United States during the nineteenth century 49 At the beginning of the 1800 s the United States had already 
interfaced its economic base with the gambling philosophy— primarily via lotteries 50 While scandals provided a 
focus for gambling opponents 51 these opponents had their positions bolstered by the socio economic negatives 
which necessarily accompany legalized gambling activities In most historical scenarios these business 
economic negatives were reflected in a decrease in the quality of life which translated into a loss of net jobs the 
creation of large social problems and the necessary increase in various taxes to address these problems 57
Accordingly most legalized gambling activities were re criminalized in the 1820 s and 1830 s 53 After the 
American Civil War gambling activities once again became fashionable and followed the expanding frontier54 
However the same socio economic problems occurred and with recumng scandals as catalysts virtually all 
gambling activities were re criminalized by 1910
The United States is now in a new third wave of legalized gambling activities55 Cynics would argue that 
if the United States wished to improve its economic position relative to the rest of the world it should 
re criminalize practically all legalized gambling activities in the United States but encourage U S companies to 
conduct their gambling activities in international markets 56 While the ethical questions of pursuing this latter
43 The U S national income in 1991 was $4 544 billion BUR.ECON ANALYSIS U S DEP T COMMERCE SURVEY OF CURRENT 
BUSINESS Jan 1993 at 10 (table 1 14) In 199"> it increased by 6 4 percent to $4 837 billion BUR.ECON ANALYSIS supra 
note 38 at 11 (table 1 14)
44 Richard Griffin Feeding Fans Greed Could Save the Game TOR STAR Mar 5 1995 at BÍ
45 Cong Hearing supra note 10 at 73 (written testimony of Economics Professor Earl L Grinds University of Illinois)
46 As of 1994 for example the U S Bureau of Economic Analysis had no economic multipliers for the legalized
gambling/nverboat industry The CED Report indicated that the multipliers for legalized gambling activities are negative 
CED REPORT supra note ~l'> at 49-50 see Cong. Hearing supra note 10 at 81 (statement of Professor John W Kindt 
Umversitv of Illinois)
47 SAMUELSON supra note 3 at 4'>4
48 Ses John W Kindt Investment Interdependence as a Potential Response bv the United States to Future Arab Oil Embargoes 
7 AUSTRAL Y B  INT L L ">79 (198”>)
49 For a summary of the historical background involving the cyclical legalization and recnminalization of gambling m the 
United States see I Nelson Rose The Impact Of American Laws On Foreign Legal Gambling 8 N Y L SCH J I NT L & COMP L 
P 9  159-66 (1986) [hereinafter Legal Gambling]
50 Id at 159
51 Id at 155 P 9  63
5 See -eneralK E onomic Impacts supra note 19 The basic ne ati\e impacts do not change although historical and 
demographical differences can prowde for multiple sanations
53 Leral Gambling supra note 49 at 159
54 ]d at 159-60
55 ]d at 160-64
6 For a companson of worldwide lonen, sales see supra note 14
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option are beyond the scope of this analysis widespread legalized gambling activities are nevertheless 
theoretically crippling the national economy
In the 1800 s the strategic economic military consequences were less destructive and less absolute but in 
the modem world the United States and its allies cannot afford to experiment with their strategic economies by 
elevating legalized gambling activities to the level where a strategic economic boom and bust cycleS7 or a 
classic speculative economic bubble 58 could occur ^  Unfortunately because of the gambling industrv and the 
vagaries of the U S legal system60 which protects the scope and speed with which the political constituencies 
supporting the legalized gambling industry develop 61 such experiments may already be so far advanced that they 
are beyond the control of U S policymakers
Due to several large socio economic negatives which are associated with legalized gambling activities but 
which neither occur in nor accompany other types of industries it can be concluded that there are substantial 
business economic reasons to believe that widespread (and even localized) legalized gambling activities are 
inherently recessionary in nature These negatives include modest increases in infrastructure costs 6 relativel> 
high increases in regulatory costs M large costs to the criminal justice system 64 and social welfare and business 
economic costs in the billions of dollars 65 These business economic costs can easily translate into recessionary 
pressures66 and lost jobs from the rest of the economy 67 significantly these costs do not generally accompany 
other industries Furthermore the ner creation of jobs claimed by the legalized gambling industry is at best a 
breakeven proposition 68 and the evidence suggests that net job losses can easily occur69— primarily because 
consumer dollars are drained from the rest of the economy 70 The literature frequently refers to this process as
57 CED REPORT supra note 22 at 18
58 For example the 1929 U S stock market scenario presents such a bubble See PAUL A S AMUELSON & W1LLIAM D 
NORDHAUS ECONOMICS 204 (14th ed 199">) ( Speculative Bubbles ) SAMUELSON supra note 3 at 424-25 See also Cong 
Hearing supra note 10 at 71-73 (written testimony of Economics Professor Earl L Gnnols University of Illinois)
59 Ss£ Steven D Gold It s Not a Miracle. It s a Mirage ST LEG1S Feb 1994 at 28
60 See generally 1 NELSON ROSE G AMBLING AND THE LAW (1986)
61 CED REPORT supra note 27 at 18
ó'’ Sse lá  at 16 Economic Impacts supra note 19 at 72 Cone. Hearing supra note 10 at 46 (testimony of Jeffry L 
Bloomberg States Atty Lawrence Co S D )
63 Sfi£ CED REPORT supra note ">2 at 16 Economic Impacts supra note 19 at 72 Cone. Hearing supra note 10 at 46 
(testimony of Jeffry L Bloomberg States Atty Lawrence Co S D )
64 £*£* CED REPORT supra note 22 at 16 Economic Impacts supra note 19 at 7’’ Cong. Hearing supra note 10 
at 46 (Jeffry L Bloomberg States Atty Lawrence Co S D )
65 g^g. MD D EP T HEALTH & M ENT AL HYGIENE A LCOHOL & DRUG A BUSE ADMIN TASK FORCE ON G AMBLING 
ADDICTION IN MARYLAND (Valerie C Lorenz & Robert M Politzer co chairs 1990) [hereinafter MARYLAND REPORT] For 
example [pathological gamblers cost Maryland and its citizens about SI 5 billion annually in lost work productivity and 
embezzled stolen or otherwise abused dollars Id at 2 The total cumulative indebtedness of Maryland s pathological gamblers 
exceeds S4 billion ¡d Furthermore untreated pathological gambling activities affects thousands of lives and costs Maryland 
billions of dollars Id See also Cone. Hearing supra note 10 at 83 (statement of Valerie C Lorenz Ph D Compulsive Gambling 
C tr)
66 £,£_ Cone. Hearing supra note 10 at 10 (oral testimony of Economics Professor Earl L Gnnols University of 
Illinois) ( [T]he social costs for an additional dollar of tax raised through gambling is in the range of $3 50 per dollar raised 
compared to only $1 45 for raising taxes the old fashioned way by raising taxes )
67 Sœ g_g, Cong. Heanng supra note 10 at 34 (statement of Congressman Richard H Baker)
68 According to a two year study by Professor Roben Goodman at the University of Massachusetts [cjasinos suck money out of 
the local economy away from existing movie theatres car dealerships clothing shops and sports arenas James Popkin & Katia 
Hetler America s Gambling Craze U S NEW S & WORLD REP Mar 14 1994 at 4"> 43 46 See also CEP REPORT supra
note "> at 5 1 53
69 Gnnols Bluff Qj_ft_mning Hand__ Rnerboat Gambling and Regional Employment and Unemployment M ILL BLS REV
Spnng 1994 at 8-11 (indicating Illinois riverboats had not created a net increase in emplovment and mav even have cost net jobs) 
Since gambling activities take jobs from the rest of the economv the creation of jobs is an illusory claim This principle is so basic 
that it is in the WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA WORLD BOOK YEAR BOOK 398 (1994) ( The emplovment increases resulting from 
most gambling operations are illusory ) See also Cong Heann. supra note 10 at 71 (written testimony of Economics Professor 
Earl L Gnnols University of Illinoi )
70 This busine economic principle is another pnn íple which is so basic that it is in the WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA
WORLD BOOK Y FAR BOOK 398-400(1994) See supra note 69 and a ompanvin text CED REPORT supra note at 49 0
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cannibalization 71 of the pre existing economy— including the pre existing tourist economy For example 
a report from the Governor s Office in California reflected this transfer of dollars and its effect on the regional 
economy
In the midst of continued (and justified) concern over the emigration of businesses and productive 
taxpayers out of California another long standing migration has been overlooked That is the migration of 
dollars out of California to the casinos of Nevada
Gambling by Californians pumps nearly $3 8 billion per year into Nevada and probably adds about 
$8 8 billion— and 196 000 jobs— to the Nevada economy counting the secondary employment it 
generates This is a direct transfer of income and wealth from California to Nevada every year77
As of 1993 not one of the fifty states had a plan concerning the statewide development of various legalized 
gambling activities74 The only baseline study was a 1976 federal report by the U S Commission on the 
Review of the National Policy Toward Gambling entitled Gambling in America 7S This 1976 report was 
apparently prompted by the proposed economic development of Atlantic City New Jersey via the legalization 
of land based casino gambling Considering that in general the Atlantic City economy has significantly 
worsened since 197 6 76 serious questions should be raised about extending this experiment nationwide
Because some demographics can easily allow the initial profit margins of many legalized gambling 
activities to be extremely large 77 it should be anticipated that major U S corporations are not only pursuing 
opportunities in the realm of legalized gambling activities but also divesting themselves of their traditional 
business lines in some instances 78
As growing numbers of people work in the gambling industry and come to be economically dependent 
on it new pro gambling constituencies will develop to protect these jobs This will make gambling ventures 
difficult for government to curtail or terminate 79
State and local governments are already utilizing taxpayer dollars to subsidize and even maintain some 
legalized gambling operations This trend is projected to intensify and create new economic problems
A major result of market saturation has been a tendency towards more lax government gambling 
regulation and public subsidies to help competing private gambling operations survive There are likely to 
be serious economic and social costs to communities as the result of this boom and bust type of 
development 80
Furthermore state and local governments have been enticed by the initial tax revenues without considering 
the social and economic consequences
71 CED REPORT supra note 22 at 51 Cong Hearing supra note 10 at 87-88 (statement of Congressman Frank R Wolf)
See also Cong. Hearing supra note 10 at 34 (statement of Congressman Richard H Baxter) Cong. Hearing supra note 10 at 57 
(statement of Professor Robert Goodman Hampshire C )
T> Sæ  e.g Press Release Fionda Dep t Com Sept 19 1994 (summarizing the 1994 report by the Fla Dep t Com ) ( A 
consistent result of the introduction of casino gambling has been the cannibalization of pre existing tounsm industry ) FLA DEP T 
COM 1MPL1CATIONS OF CASINO G AMBLING AS AN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY (1994) [hereinafter F LA D EP T C OM 
REPORT]
73 CAL GOV SOFF PLAN & RESEARCH CALIFORNIA AND NEVADA SUBSIDY MONOPOLY AND COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF 
LEGALIZED GAMBLING ES 1 (199'>)
74 CED REPORT supra note 22 at 16 In 1994 however the Fionda Department of Commerce issued a report which indicated 
that legalized casino style gambling would cannibalize the pre existing Fionda economy FLA DEP TCOM REPORT supra 
note T> at 5
75 COMM NON G AMBLING supra note 30
76 See generalis GEORGE STERNLIEB & JAMF.S W HUGHES THE ATLANTIC CITY GAMBLE 95-110 (1983)
77 For example the largest hotel in the United States the Excalibur in Las Vegas stunned market analysts bv announcin it had 
alread\ paid off [its] mongage from operating revenues in less than two vears James Coates Vegas Tip to Chicago Casino 
Is Family Fun CHI TRIB Apr 10 199-7 M at 1 10 £ee e_,^ Marv Ellen Podmolik Empress Investors Win Bi_ CHI SUN 
TIMES Apr 8 1994 at 5 (almost 300 percent return on investment within 6 months for the Empress nverboat in Illinois)
78 See generally DAVID JOHNSTON T EMPLES OF CHANCE HOW AMERICA INC BOUGHT OUT MURDER INC TO WIN CONTROL 
OFTHE CASINO BUSINESS (199'»)
79 CED REPORT supra note
80 id
at 18
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Funding specific programs with eambling revenues has tended to make them gambling dependent It has
also tended to make those groups who benefit from them pan of pro gambling political constituencies81
In this context the main benefits allegedly generated by increased legalized gambling activities include not 
only new tax revenues but also new jobs and positive economic development The potential profit margins are 
so large that companies will invest millions of dollars to encourage the legalization of gambling activities in 
various states 87 In 1994 for example at least $16 0 million was spent m a losing campaign to bring casino 
gambling to Florida 83 and at least $15 million was spent during two years on campaigns (including $8 million 
in the 1994 winning campaign) to bring video gambling terminals to M issouri84 In 1992 approximatelv 
$5 million85 was spent by three companies to promote the possibility of a $2 billion casino complex in 
Chicago 86 However skeptical economists emphasize that any influx of money to a commumtv will create 
the appearance of economic development and the socio economic costs should not be overlooked 87
Several studies by the gambling industry allegedly bolster the claims of economic benefits and to examine 
these claims the Ford Foundation and the Aspen Institute funded a comprehensive 1994 report by the Center for 
Economic Development at the University of Massachusetts which was entitled Legalized Gambling as a 
Strategy fo r  Economic Development (CED R eport)88 The CED Report analyzed fourteen industry studies and 
in general was highly critical of them 89 Emphasizing that no state had a comprehensive development plan 
which analyzed legalizing gambling activities 90 the CED Report concluded that hiding the costs 91 was 
apparently widespread and that legalizing gambling activities acted as economic cannibalism 92 on the 
pre existing economy and on other businesses 93
In the social welfare context legalized gambling is widely accepted as constituting a regressive tax on the 
poor94 In other words governmental policies directed toward legalizing and encouraging gambling activities 
make poor people poorer and intensify many pre existing social welfare problems 95 These socio economic 
negatives are calculated to be extremely costly and they parallel the negatives associated with alcohol and drug 
addiction 96 Substantial changes and m many instances unpredictable consequences can be anticipated 
throughout the insurance industry (ì e increased fraud in the billions of dollars) 97 the banking industry (ì e
81 M
82 £ge g_g_ S16.5 Million Campaign supra note 25
83 Id
84 Slot Games In supra note 18 at 6 ($15 million spent within two years by nverboat gambling proponents)
85 See e_g_ Patrick T Reardon & Rick Pearson Casino Firms Sav Patience Tapped Out CHI TRIB Dec 4 1997 §"> at 1 7 
(S5 million) See also Stephen F Simurda When Gambling Comes To Town COLUM JOURNALISM REV Jan Feb 1994
at 36 36 million spent to promote approval of a casino in Connecticut) [hereinafter COLUM JOURNALISM REV ]
86 For a positive analysis of the Chicago proposal see CHICAGO GAMING COMM N ECONOMIC AND OTHER IMPACTS OF A 
PROPOSED GAMING ENTERTAINMENT AND HOTEL FACILITY (May 19 199">) Contra BETTER GOV T ASSOC STAFF WHITE 
PAPER C asino GAMBLING in CHICAGO (1992) (a comprehensive and well documented report) [hereinafter BETTER GOV TASSOC 
REPORT]
87 See generally BETTER GOV TASSOC REPORT supra note 86 (introductory statements by BGA President William Lear and 
Exec Dir Terrence Brunner)
88 CED REPORT supra note 22
89 ]d at 16-19
90 Id at 16
91 Id
9° Id at 18 39 51 See also Gold supra note 59
93 Gold supra note 59 at 30
94 Sœ CHARLES T CLOTFELTER & PHILIP J
1989)
9-> See Economic Impacts supra note 19 at 61-70
96 See Durand F Jacobs Illegal and Undocumented A Review of Teenage Gambling and the Plight of Children of Problem 
Gamblers in America in C OMPULSIVE G AMBLING THEORY RESEARCH ANDPRACTICE ">49 “»rP (Howard J Shaffer et al eds 
1989)
97 Compul ive Gambling supra note ^9 at 4o (In 199"> insurance fraud due to legalized gamblin activities va alreadv at
SI 3 billion ) see al o Henrv R Lesieur &. Kenneth Pui Insnran e Problems and Patholo-ical Gamblin- J GAMBLING BEHA\ 
Summer 1987 at 1 3
at 30
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extended credit losses)98 and the general business community including for example increased personnel 
costs 99 lost work productivity 100 and bankruptcies 101
In the national media the cost benefit debate involving increased legalized gambling has been growing in 
scope As this trend continues a 1994 article in the Columbia Journalism Re\iew cautions the news media to 
flat out ask [experts academics and even other reporters] if they make money off the industrv 10
Instinctively several prestigious U S business groups have responded to these concerns For example in 
September of 1993 the eighty five member Greater Washington D C Board of Trade unanimously rejected the 
Mayor s proposal to bnng casino style gambling to Washington D C 10:1
The gravamen of much of this debate is that state governments by legalizing gambling activities are 
creating large socio economic problems which did not previously exist It is well established that bv 
legalizing gambling activities (the acceptability factor ) and making those activities available to the public 
(the accessibility factor ) state governments are creating a new population of addicted gamblers— a recognized 
addictive activity pursuant to the American Psychiatric Association (APA) 104 with parallels to alcohol and drug 
addictions 105 From a baseline of 0 77 percent 106 the percentage of the adult population who are compulsive 
gamblers wan easily rise to between 1 5 and 5 percent once gambling is legalized 107 The percentage of teens who 
become compulsive gamblers generally ranges between four and six percent but this range appears to be 
increasing 108
98 One interesting trend consists of legalized gaming establishments extending credit to customers Having just been authorized 
in 1991 the Illinois nverboats during 1993 were already legally extending $115 million in credit Toby Eckert Riverboats Give 
Gamblers $115 Million in Credit in 93 PEORIA J STAR Apr 17 1994 at Al
99 Many of these increased personnel costs can be directly attributed to calculable increases in compulsive gamblers caused by the 
legalization of gambling activities Average compulsive gamblers are those compulsive gamblers in the intermediate stage of 
gambling addiction By comparison the larger social costs are reflected in those compulsive gamblers who are in the later stages of 
gambling addiction and have bottomed out ROBERT M POLITZER ET AL R EPORT ON THE SOCIETAL COST OF PATHOLOGICAL 
GAMBLING AND THE COST BENEFIT/EFFECTIVENESS OF TREATMENT at 9 10 (1981) See also M ARYLAND REPORT supra
note 65 at 2 59 61 It should be noted that virtually all of these estimates are based on male subjects as recorded in the MARYLAND 
REPORT When adjusted for inflation as of 1992 the $52 000 per year cost for each compulsive gambler increases to $53 000 per 
year BETTER GOV T ASSOC REPORT sunra note 86 at 14
Abused dollars are defined as [ejstimates of the average annual amount obtained legally and/or illegally by the 
pathological gambler which otherwise would have been used by the pathological gambler his family or his victims for 
other essential purposes These abused dollars include earned income put at nsk in gambling borrowed and/or illegally 
obtained dollars put at nsk in gambling borrowed and/or illegally obtained dollars spent on basic needs and/or provided 
to the family which otherwise would have been used for gambling and borrowed and/or illegally obtained dollars for the 
partial payment of gambling related debts POLITZER ET AL supra at 9 as cited in BETTER GOV T ASSOC REPORT 
supra note 86 at 15
100 Lost work productivity equates to the sociological concept of lost productivity and is defined as [estimates of percent of 
time not engaged in the production of goods and services for which the individual was employed multiplied by the average gross 
annual salary POLITZER ET AL supra note 99 at 8 (emphasis in original) as cited in BETTER GOV TASSOC REPORT supra 
note 86 at 15 Characteristic problems of the compulsive gambler include inattention to work pursuant to the American 
Psychiatric Association s DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL M ANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 324 (3d ed rev 1987) [hereinafter 
DSM-III]
101 Significant increases in bankruptcies occurred in South Dakota after the advent of legalized gambling activities particularly 
casino gambling and video lottery terminals (VLT s) in 1989 See Todd Nelson S D Bankruptcies Down 5 Percent Judge Gambling 
Caused Most Cases ARGUS LEADER Jan 15 1993 at 1
10'» COLUM JOURNALISM REV supra note 85 at 37-38
103 Liz Spayd & Yolanda Woodlee Trade Board Reiects D.C. Casino Plan WASH POST Sept ">5 1993 at Al
104 DSM-III supra note 100 § 3 P 3 1  (Pathological Gambling)
105 $££ Jacobs supra note 96 at ">5'
106 COMM NON GAMBLING supra note 30 at 73
107 For a table showing prevalence rates of problem and probable pathological gamblers at between 1 7 ana 6 9 percent for adults 
see ALTA LOTTERIES AND GAMING GAMBLING AND PROBLEM G AMBLING IN ALBERTA at 18 (1994) (Native Amen ans in one 
studv equaled 14 5 percent)
108 Id (showing prevalence rates between 3 6 and P  4 percent for teenagers) BETTER GOV TASSOC REPORT supra note 86
at 30 (between 4 and 15 percent of high schoolers are problem gamblers — not to be confused with compulsive eamblers which 
are subsumed in the category of problem eamblers ) For analyses of compulsive and problem eamblin amone teenaeers see 
Ja obs su^ra note 96 at -v (reportin five studies) See also Roben Lodauceur &. Charnel Mireault Gamhlin, Beha lors Amon. 
Hiph S hool Students in the Quebe Area 4 J  GAMBLING BEHAN 3(1988)  Henrv R Lesieur &. Roben Mein Paiholo.i al
in John  H K inch
It is significant that compulsive gambling will probably hover at approximately 0 77 percent of the 
population109 no matter what ethicists and governments do to eradicate or solve this problem However the 
interesting statistic is that once state governments legalise gambling— once gambling receives the imprimatur 
of government and becomes not only sociologically acceptable but also is advertised as such— the number of 
compulsive gamblers will increase from 0 77 percent to between 1 5 and 5 percent of the population Thus in a 
state with a population of 10 million the number of compulsive gamblers would increase from 77 000 to 
between 150 000 and 500 000 There is some debate about how fast this increase will occur but it will 
definitely occur For example in South Dakota110— which had no legalized gambling per se before the state 
lottery in 1987 but which initiated more legalized gambling in October 1989 via land based casinos and video 
lottery terminals (VLT s)— the best data strongly suggests that an additional one percent of the population 
(approximately 7 000 people)111 became addicted within two years These numbers include the adolescent 
population which is already reflecting twice the addiction rate of the adult population
The social business economic and governmental costs of this phenomenon are potentially catastrophic 
The average socio economic cost per compulsive gambler per year has been calculated at $53 000 11 Therefore 
by legalizing land based casino gambling and VLT s the South Dakota legislature has created within two 
years an additional $371 million per year in economic and social costs to its citizens The negative numbers 
generated bv this phenomenon are so large that they demand to be checked and rechecked but even if they are 
smaller by half m  the negative numbers are significant enough to predict major problems for U S society 
business and government
Conclusion
Throughout the twentieth century the U S economy has operated within a type of pristine economic 
environment uncontaminated by widespread legalized gambling However because pro gambling philosophies 
are spreading rapidly throughout the United States and the governmental infatuation with legalized gambling is 
so pervasive the impacts of legalized gambling will soon be felt throughout the local state and federal 
governmental systems— regardless of whether a particular state has or has not legalized a particular form of 
gambling Academic disciplines will change and the standard economic formulas will have to be modified to 
accommodate the economic impacts of the gambling industry Education will suffer both philosophically and 
fiscally as educational budgets are redirected toward addressing the increasing social welfare costs
The criminal justice system will incur not only increased costs but the types of crimes will change to 
redress new forms of misconduct like gamblers unfairly beating the odds or cheating the legalized gambling 
operations Financial institutions and banks will experience rapid and perhaps destabilizing impacts as 
pre existing assets and large proportions of fixed consumer assets are diverted into legalized gambling activities 
Bad debts and increased insurance fraud are projected to increase significantly 114
Gambling Among High School Students 12 ADDICTIVE BEHAV P 9  (1987) See generally Michael L Frank Underage Gambling in 
Atlantic City Casinos 67 PSYCHOL REP 907 (1990) Clinical Professor of Psychiatry Durand Jacobs of the Loma Linda University 
Medical School generally sets the overall percentage of teenage compulsive gamblers at 4 to 6 percent
109 COMM N ON GAMBLING supra note 30 at 73 This study apparently provides the most authoritative historical baseline in 
this as well as other gambling related issue areas It should be noted that there are considerable definitional debates regarding what 
constitutes a compulsive or pathological gambler a probable compulsive gambler and a potential compulsive gambler The 
South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS) appears to be the most generally accepted current mechanism for delimiting these categories 
Henrv R Lesieur & Sheila B Blume The South Oaks Gambling Screen (the SOGs) 4 New Instrument for the Identification of 
Pathological Gamblers 144 AM J PSYCHIATRY 1184 (1987)
110 South Dakota has a population of 700 000 people U S BUR CENSUS ( 1993)
11 1 Economic Impacts supra note 19 at 74
I P  SeeBETTERGOV TASSOC REPORT supra note 86 at 14 (S'P  000/yr is adjusted for inflation in 199° dollars) (citin. to 
POLITZER ET AL supra note 99) Bv 1994 the range of cost estimates began to fluctuate between S I 3 "’00 and SS3 000 with most 
estimates beginning to group around S 13 °00 to S35 000 See Cong Hearing supra note 10 at 80 n P  (statement of Professor 
John W Kindt Lmversitv of Illinois) (citin studies)
I P  See supra note 11 and accompanving text 
114 See apra note 9/ 98 and a ompanvin text
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If the gambling trends of the 1990 s continue the negative impacts of gambling activities will prolong 
recessionary trends and slow recoveries in local state and national economies The economic history of the 
United States has indicated that the U S public has intermittently flirted with gambling and repeatedly rejected it 
as economically and sociologically unworkable Legislators who forget this economic history and promote 
legalized gambling are subject to being criticized as mere mechanics 115 Those who forget the economic lessons 
of history are condemned to relive them 116
If the U S public liked the War on Crime and the War on Drugs the public will be enthralled with the 
forthcoming War on Gambling 117 The tragedy is that unlike the first two wars on social ills the War on 
Gambling can still be avoided— simply by not decriminalizing or otherwise legalizing gambling activities In 
other words it will take affirmative government action to magnify a minor social ill into a major socio 
economic problem
Governmental officials are increasingly being enticed to accept and then impose upon the public those 
discredited economic philosophies which claim that gambling activities increase jobs foster economic 
development and generate new tax revenues— all without raising taxes on the electorate In reality the regional 
and strategic impacts of legalized gambling almost invariably result in a net loss of jobs increased taxes and a 
negative economic spiral which is inherently recessionary
In 1988 the national societal costs of alcohol abuse were calculated at $120 billion and the costs of other 
substance abuse were calculated at $60 billion 118 By comparison the national societal costs for compulsive 
gambling were calculated at $80 billion and were found to be increasing rapidly 119 however unlike alcohol and 
substance abuse the costs of compulsive gambling are less obvious because the abused substance is money 1 0 
and some of these costs translate into lost work productivity
In practically all disciplines the strategic negatives associated with gambling activities are so large that the 
conclusions in this analysis might seem somewhat alarmist The strategic figures however appear to constitute 
the best evidence available within those parameters which academic authority can establish at this juncture in 
business economic history As confirmed by the 1994 CED R eport121 the Florida Department of Commerce 
Report P2 and the 1994 congressional hearing 123 the gambling adherents have little solid data or authority 
supporting their statements about the many alleged social benefits of legalized gambling activities 124
Regardless of these considerations it appears to be widely accepted that U S economic strength constitutes 
a sine qua non of worldwide economic stability Any industry which has a growth rate as substantial as that of 
the legalized gambling industry and which has the potential cannibalize the pre existing economy with a
115 This statement is a paraphrase of [a] lawyer without history or literature is a mechanic Guy Mannenng as quoted in 
J BARTLETT FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 5">0 ( 14th ed 1968)
116 Id at 507 While this phrase has been paraphrased by many authors it probably originated with historian Georg Hegel
117 See John W Kindt Increased Crime and Legalized Gambling Operations The Impact on the Socio Economics of Business and 
Government 43 CRIM L BULL 538 538-39 (1994) For an authontame 1994 reaffirmation of the principle that increased crime 
accompanies legalizing gambling activities see FLA DEP T L  ENFORCEMENT THE QUESTION OF CASINOS IN FLORIDA 
INCREASED CRIME IS IT WORTH THE GAMBLE (1994)
As this report reflects it has been clearly demonstrated in other jurisdictions that a significant increase in crime and its 
consequences accompanies casino gambling FDLE joins a large number of other criminal justice entities in opposition 
to any form of legalized casino gambling
Id at 0 See also COMM NON GAMBLING supra note 30 at 1 N J REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE GOVERNOR S 
ADVISORY COMM N ON GAMBLING 19 (1988)
118 M ARYLAND REPORT supra note 65 at 60
119 Id at S9
P 0  See id at
P I  CED REPORT supra note l"1 at 16-19
I 7 FLA DEPT COM REPORT supra note T> a t '’ 5 -6
P 3  See Con, Heann_ supra note 10 passim
I 4 B ETTER GOV T ASSOC REPORT supra note 86 at - 1
/ John  Vi Kindl
potential negative multiplier effect1 s needs to be closel> examined At a minimum a national commission to 
investigate the economic claims of the industry is necessary In the interim prudent strategic national policy 
necessitates that there be a federal moratorium on any increases in the various forms of legalized gambling 
activities or increases in its geographical expansion
See upra note 46 9 1 —*4^  and a companxin text
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